Israeli-Palestinian conflict

(The neutrality of this article is disputed.)

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a part of the greater Arab-Israeli conflict, is an ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Today the conflict is mainly over these issues:

The future of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and the question of creating a Palestinian state in these territories.
The fate of the Palestinian refugees.

The refugee issue was added during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The issue of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was introduced into it in 1967 following the Six Day War.

Table of contents

1 History
2 The Peace process

2.1 Palestinian views of the peace process
2.2 Israeli views of the peace process
2.3 Camp David 2000 Summit
2.4 Al-Aqsa Intifada
2.5 "Road Map" for Peace
2.6 Alternative peace proposals
2.7 List of Peace Proposals

3 Peace and reconciliation
4 Related articles

4.8 Ethnicity
4.9 Religion
4.10 Geography
4.11 Places
4.12 History
4.13 Ideology and ideas
4.14 Media coverage
4.15 Elements of the conflict
4.16 Organizations and armed forces
4.17 People
4.18 Related conflicts

5 External links

History

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the account of events of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beginning in the 1880s and continuing to present day.

The Peace process

See Oslo Accords

In 1991, just after the First Gulf War, a breakthrough occurred when US president George H.W. Bush called a conference in Madrid, Spain, dubbed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. It broke down but was replaced by a series of clandestine meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, signed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with US President Bill Clinton on the White House lawn. Rabin, Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Palestinian views of the peace process

See Palestinian views of the peace process

Israeli views of the peace process

See Israeli views of the peace process

After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process slowed to a grinding halt. The Palestinians living in the occupied territories did not see their living conditions improve. Additionally the illegal Israeli settlements, seen by the Palestinians as one of the largest obstacles to peace, were not beginning to be dismantled. Instead their population almost doubled on the West Bank even if few new settlements were constructed. This along with sporadic suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retribution from the Israelis made the situation untenable.

In 2000, Clinton convened a peace summit between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. But these talks failed to produce any agreement at all.

Al-Aqsa Intifada

See Al-Aqsa Intifada

On September 28, 2000 the Israeli opposition leader, Ariel Sharon made his famous visit to the Temple Mount (also called Haram Ash-Sharif). The already violent situation broke out into what has become known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

More suicide attacks than ever before were executed in Israel. In response, the Israeli army reoccupied the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield enforcing strict military law, sealed off the Gaza Strip and imposed economic sanctions on the Palestinians. To this date, the violence has resulted in over 3000 deaths, according to the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group 2569 Palestinians and 695 Israelis, and the situation continues to be unstable.

According to the Middle East Policy Council: as of April 3, 2004, 3709 people have been killed as a result of the conflict since September 29, 2000. 872 Israelis (including IDF troops during Palestinian incursions) have been killed by Palestinian militants or suicide bombers, and 2837 Palestinians (not including militants, suicide bombers, or targeted assinations) have been killed by Israeli military forces or Israeli settlers.

Israel claims that it is Arafat that is responsible for the violence from the Palestinian side and has also claimed that they have evidence for that claim. Arafat disputes that claim and has many times condemned the suicide bombings.

"Road Map" for Peace

See Road map for peace

In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat.

The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established.

In the first step, the Palestinian authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure".
Israel was required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.[1]

After gaining office, Abbas stated that he could not act against Hamas without causing a civil war. It also became clear that Abbas only had control of a fraction of the Palestinian security apparatus, with the bulk remaining under Arafat's control. On June 29, 2003, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed to a 3-month "hudna" (temporary ceasefire), conditional on Israel ceasing its assassinations of Palestinian leaders and a mass release of Palestinians in Israeli administrative detention. Israel promised to withdraw some forces from Palestinian areas but would not promise to discontinue its practice of assassinations.

For about 6 weeks there was a substantial decrease in violence, with exceptions on both sides. After that the hudna unravelled rapidly. On August 12, Israel killed two Hamas militants and two others in Nablus. The next day a Hamas bomber and an Islamic Jihad bomber from Nablus each killed one Israeli and injured several. On August 14, Israel assassinated Muhammad Seeder, the Islamic Jihad chief of military operations in Hebron. On August 19 a Hamas suicide bomber killed 34 religious Jews who were returning by bus from prayer at the Wailing Wall. Two days later Israeli helicopters killed the 4th ranking leader of Hamas, Ismail Abu Shanab. Hamas and Islamic Jihad renounced the hudna at this stage, though it was clearly already dead. Over the following days, Israel continued helicopter missile strikes against Hamas heads in the Gaza strip. Israeli commandos also targeted Hamas heads in Hebron (Abbedalla Quwassama, Ahmed Bader) and Nablus (Mohammed Hanabli). Many of these actions resulted in casualties among (innocent) bystanders.

Armed Fatah activists publicly threatened Abbas's life. Abbas was not given any power from Arafat to carry out any of the aspects of the road map to peace, and Abbas eventually resigned due to lack of political support both from the Palestinian Authority and the public in general. In his resignation speech, Abbas sited the lack of support both from Arafat and Israel as the cause of his failure.

Alternative peace proposals

With the road map in difficulties, pressure has grown to find an alternative way forward. On December 7, 2003, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a unilateral withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and Gaza strip, abandoning some Jewish settlements while annexing some territory. This was interpreted by many as a trial balloon on behalf of Ariel Sharon, who followed it up with a speech on December 18 giving the Palestinian Authority "a few months" to comply with the road map before Israel took "unilateral steps". The speech was strongly criticised by the United States government, which warned against pre-empting the road map's outcome, and by many on the Israeli right, who saw any withdrawal as an end to their Zionist mandate to take over more land.

Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On December 1, the two parties signed an unofficial blueprint for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord) which set out a basic framework for the resolution of the conflict. In terms of its end goals, it was not too dissimilar from those of the road map, but it adopted a "big bang" approach of settling all the big issues at once rather than taking a step-by-step approach. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by New York Professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Somewhat surprisingly, some Israeli settler groups supported it, seeing it as a way by which Israel could permanently legitimise its hold on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems a highly improbable solution to the problem.